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This paper makes a contribution to the debate on the economic effects of military 
spending using a large cross country panel data set for 1988-2006.  As well as providing 
a relatively up to date analysis, sub groups are created that allow the analysis to focus on 
groups of countries at different income levels and Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), an area 
which has seen a large number of damaging conflicts. Estimating the empirical growth 
model suggested in Dunne et al (2005) gives results that show variation across the 
subgroups, with the general picture of significant negative short run effect and 
insignificant long run effect of military burden on per capita GDP growth, not consistent 
across the different income groups. In addition, breaking down the SSA group into those 
involved in conflict and those that are not, provides some further intriguing findings that 
suggest the value of further work on the impact of conflict on growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The economic effects of military spending continues to be the subject of considerable 
debate with a lack of any consensus in the literature. It continues to be an important focus 
for research as it is an expenditure by governments that has influence beyond the 
resources it takes up, especially when it leads to or facilitates conflicts. While most 
countries need some level of security to deal with internal and external threats, there are 
opportunity costs, as the money could be used for other purposes that might improve 
welfare.  With the end of the Cold War there were considerable reductions in military 
expenditure, although not consistently across all regions and with no obvious economic 
problems, but in more recent years the declining trend has bottomed out and military 
expenditures are increasing. This is true across all income groups. While the lowest 
income group has seen the highest growth in military spending since 2000, military 
expenditure as a share of GDP remained lower for this income group relative to the 
others (SIPRI, 2008). While there have been a few major international conflicts and 
internal conflict has been a major concern for the developing world, the major pressures 
to increase military spending have not been the result of obvious strategic needs, but of 
internal pressures by vested interests.  
 
This paper considers the economic effects of military spending using a large unbalanced 
panel of countries, for the period 1988-2006, and investigates the heterogeneity of results 
across income groups. The next section reviews the existing literature for developing 
countries, followed by the development of a growth model based on Dunne et al (2005), 
which includes military sending and overcomes some of the limitations of earlier models. 
This model is then estimated using the cross country data, in the following section, with 
the results for various groupings of countries also being considered. Sub-Saharan Africa 
is then considered, a region which despite reductions in the number of conflicts is still 
affected by them. The final section presents some conclusions.  
 
 
2. Military Spending and Growth 
 
In analysing the relation between military spending and development, applied work is 
usually restricted to economic growth because of the problems of defining and measuring 
development. Developing a theoretical model is important for any empirical study, but much 
of economic theory does not have an explicit role for military spending as a distinctive 
economic activity. However, this has not prevented the development of theoretical analyses 
as discussed in Dunne & Coulomb (2008). In empirical work the fact that there is no 
agreed theory of growth among economists, means that there is no standard framework 
that military spending can be fitted into. Clearly, in developing countries military 
spending, conflict, economic capacity (education, governance, institutions, natural 
resources) all interact to influence growth. Indeed, many poor countries, even those with 
civil wars, spend relatively little on the military. In particular many African countries 
have low military burdens, but there are other obstacles to growth (Collier, 2007). The 
theoretical work has allowed the identification of a number of channels through which 
military spending can impact the economy, through labour, capital, technology, external   3
relations, socio political effects, debt, conflicts etc  (see Dunne and Uye, 2009). The relative 
importance and sign of these effects and the overall impact on growth can only be 
ascertained by empirical analysis. 
 
An important issue in empirical work is the identification problem that results from the 
fact that we observe military spending and growth changing and both are influenced by 
security threats. If the economic determinants of growth are constant, but there are 
variations in the security threat, a negative relationship between military expenditure and 
output will be observed. On the other hand, if the threat is constant but the economic 
variables are changing, a positive relationship between military expenditure and output 
will be observed. This can be used to explain some country experiences with different 
combinations of growth and military expenditure. It also suggests caution in interpreting 
the results of empirical studies (Smith, 2000). 
 
Clearly all of the channels mentioned will interact and their influence will vary 
depending on the countries under examination. For example, a relatively advanced 
developing country, such as one of the Asian ‘tigers’ will have concerns over the 
industrial impact of its involvement in arms production, the technology and foreign direct 
investment benefits versus the opportunity cost, while a poorer African economy may be 
more concerned with the conflict trap it finds itself in.  
 
In the empirical literature, the debate on the economic effects of military spending started 
with the contribution of Benoit (1973, 1978) which purported to show that military 
expenditure and development went hand in hand. This led to considerable research activity 
using econometric analysis to overcome the deficiencies, most of which has tended not to 
support Benoit, but there is still no consensus view (Dunne and Uye, 2009).  The post-Cold 
war era led to important changes in the nature of conflicts. The end of proxywars 
(conflicts sponsored by the Cold War protagonists) and superpower involvement in local 
wars did not reduce the number of conflicts, but did reduce their intensity, and saw a 
dominance of civil or intra state wars. The nature of wars clearly changed with a blurred 
distinction between war and organised crime, and while local, the wars tended to have a 
transnational connection (Kaldor, 2006). There are fewer real military battles than in the 
past, but skirmishes and attacks on civilians increased. This might suggest a change in the 
economic impact of conflict. 
 
Previous surveys of the military spending growth literature include Chan (1986), who found 
a lack of consistency in the results, Ram (1995) who reviewed 29 studies, concluding that 
there is little evidence of a positive effect of defence outlays on growth, but that it was also 
difficult to say that the evidence supported a negative effect. Dunne (1996) covering 54 
studies concluded that military spending had at best no effect on growth and was likely to 
have a negative effect and Smith (2000) concluded that the large literature did not indicate 
any robust empirical regularity, positive or negative, though he suggested there is a small 
negative effect in the long run, but one that requires considerably more sophistication to 
find. Smaldone (2006) in his review of Africa considers military spending relationships to 
be heterogeneous, elusive and complex, but feels that variations can be explained by 
intervening variables. The effects can be both positive and negative but are usually not   4
pronounced, although the negative effects tend to be wider and deeper in Africa and most 
severe in countries experiencing legitimacy/security crisis and economic/budgetary 
constraints. Dunne and Uye (2009) in a survey of 102 studies on the economic effects of 
military spending, report that almost 39% of the cross country studies and 35% of the case 
studies find a negative effect of military spending on growth, with only around 20% finding 
positive for both types of studies. Models allowing for a demand side, and hence the 
possibility of crowding out investment, tend to find negative effects, unless there is some 
reallocation to other forms of government spending, while those with only a supply side find 
positive, or positive but insignificant effects. That the supply side models find a positive 
effect is not a surprise as the model is inherently structured to find such a result (Brauer, 
2002).  Given this, the fact that over 40% of the studies find unclear results could be 
interpreted as providing further evidence against there being a positive impact of military 
spending on the economy. 
 
It is also worth noting that the military burden, the share of military spending in GDP is 
relatively low in most developing countries (less than 2% for low income countries) 
relative to other components of GDP, such as health and education. As a result one might 
not expect to find a statistically significant effect on the path of national income, when 
there are so many other influences. Aside from when countries are engaged in conflict 
one might not expect to find significant impacts of arms transfers and military spending, 
which makes it interesting when studies do.  
 
 
3. Developing a Growth Model with Military Spending 
 
The deficiencies of the Feder Ram model presented in Dunne et al (2005) lead us to 
consider an alternative route. Specifically, we develop a model of the effect of military 
spending on growth performance based on the augmented Solow growth model with 
Harrod-neutral technical progress. This follows Knight, Loayza and Villanueva 
(1996;1993) and a key assumption is that the military spending share m = M/Y affects 
factor productivity via a levels effect on the efficiency parameter which controls labour-
augmenting technical change. The starting point for the model is the aggregate 
neoclassical production function featuring labour-augmenting technological progress 
 
(1) 
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where Y denotes aggregate real income, K is the real capital stock, L is labour, and the 
technology parameter A evolves according to 
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where g is the exogenous rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress and m is an index of 
military expenditure such as the share of defence spending in GDP. 
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Together with the standard Solow model assumptions (constant saving rate s; constant 
labour force growth rate n; constant rate of capital depreciation d), the dynamics of 
capital accumulation are described by 
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where ke:=K/[AL] denotes the effective capital-labour ratio and α is the constant capital-
output elasticity. 
 
The steady-state level of ke is 
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Linearizing (3) via a truncated Taylor series expansion around the steady state
1 and using 
(4), we get 
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Equation (6) approximates  the transitory dynamics of output per effective labour unit in 
a neighbourhood of the steady state. In order to operationalize (6) for empirical work, we 
integrate (6) forward from t-1 to t and get 
 
(8)  ) )( 1 ( , ln ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ln ) ( ln




e + + − ≡ − + − = α . 
 
Using (2), (7) and (8),  ye is related to observable per capita income y = Y/L via 
 
 
                                            
1 Re-writing (3) in the form du/dt = f(u), u:=ln ke, the linearized form is f(u*) + f'(u*)[u(t)-u*].   6
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Equation (9) suggests the dynamic panel data model 
 
(10)  ν µ η β γ + + + + = ∑
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1 , , ln ln ln  i=1,2,...,N;  t=1,2,...T 
where x1= s = gross investment/GDP, x2 = n+g+d = labour force growth rate plus (g+d) 
=the constant 0.05, x3 = m = military expenditure/GDP, x4 = mt-1;  t η time specific effects 
and   i µ  group specific effects. Thus, we follow Knight et al (1993) and Islam (1995) in 




4. Empirical Analysis 
 
A major problem in estimating growth models has been the lack of independent 
exogenous variation in the data. One way of overcoming this has been by pooling cross 
section and time series data for a relatively homogenous group of countries (Murdoch et 
al, 1997). There is a problem that the cross section and time series parameter may be 
measuring different thing, the former the long run and the latter the short run effects. The 
pooled relation is then a weighted average of the two. Growth equations have been most 
successful in cross sections, because of the difficulties of distinguishing the cyclical 
demand side effects from medium term supply side growth effects. 
 
Panel data methods provide a variety of approaches to attempt to deal with some of these 
issues, with pooling being the simplest form and fixed effect and random coefficient 
estimators providing more flexible approaches. The fixed effects estimator allows the 
intercept to differ across countries, which ignores all information in the cross sectional 
relation. Time fixed effects can also be allowed for separately or together in a two way 
fixed effect model. In dynamic models of the form: 
yjt = αj + β xjt + λ xjt-1 + ujt 
the  fixed  effect  estimator  is  not  efficient,  because  of  lagged  dependent  variable  bias, 
which biases OLS downwards. It is, however, consistent and for large samples the bias is 
small. If the parameters differ over groups there is a further heterogeneity bias, which can 
be  dealt  with  by  estimating  each  equation  individually  and  taking  an  average  of  the 
individual estimates (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). The data available in this study is not 
long  enough  to  use  large-N  large-T  methods,  so  we  use  a  Fixed-Effects  Model,  but 
introduce dynamics. While there is downwards lagged dependent variable bias, the bias is 
likely to be small and when computing the long run coefficients the biases are likely to 
offset each other. Taking equation (10’) 
   7
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Where: 
y = yp = GDP per capita 
x1= iy = gross investment/GDP,  
x2 = my = military expenditure/GDP,  
x4 = ngd = n+g+d = labour force growth rate + 0.05,  
 x5 = tr = trend 
 
 
Estimating a reparameterised general first order dynamic model gave the results in Table 
1, where all variables are in logs, ∆ represents the change in the variable, and the 
dependent variable is ∆lyp. The results for all available countries in column 1 show a 
relatively well defined empirical model with signs as expected and a clear negative effect 
of the change in military burden, but not the lagged level. This suggests evidence of short 
run negative effects of military spending, but not long run. Considering only the non-
developed countries (low and middle income) reduces the sample but gives surprisingly 
little change in the coefficient estimates. 
 
 
Table 1. Regression Results for Fixed Effects Model 
 
Variable    All countries   Non-developed      
      n=126     n=96        
 
∆liy        0.085 (10.9)    0.080 (8.7)      
∆lmy      -0.016 (3.0)      -0.014 (2.2)      
lngd      -0.022 (2.3)    -0.022 (2.0)      
lyp1      -0.132 (13.0)    -0.153 (11.9)    
liy1        0.034 (6.6)            0.033 (5.6)    
lmy1      -0.002 (0.4)           -0.0002 (0.0)    
trend        0.004 (12.5)    0.004 (11.6)    
Constant     -6.522 (11.7)   -7.608 (10.9)    
 
N      1784    1308      
Rsq within    0.189    0.202      
Rsq between    0.020    0.075      
Notes: absolute t ratios in parentheses 
 
While it is a useful result, to find only short run effects of military expenditure in the post 
Cold War period, it is possible that these aggregate groups hide considerable 
heterogeneity. As argued, the effect of military spending may well be very different for 
the poorest countries relative to the richest and to consider such differences the countries 
were divided into four income groups, based on World Bank assessment, giving the 
results in Table 2. As expected there are differences and the growth model is generally   8
well specified, though the investment share terms are insignificant for the low income 
countries and lngd insignificant for the lower middle group. As regards military burden, 
the difference term is significant and negative for all except the upper middle group and 
the lagged level is significant and negative only for the low income group –although the 
lagged level is positive for the high income countries and significant at the 6% level. This 
implies that there are clear significant short and long run negative effects of military 






Table 2. Regression Results by Income Group: Fixed Effects 
 
Variable    Low    Lower Middle  Upper Middle  High 
 
      n=24     n=35     n=31    n=35   
 
∆liy       0.005 (0.3)   0.089 (6.0)  0.158 (9.7)   0.128 (10.0) 
∆lmy      -0.041 (3.2)      -0.026 (2.2)  0.001 (0.1)  -0.030 (2.7) 
lngd      -0.072 (3.8)    -0.005 (0.2)  0.068 (2.4)  -0.020 (2.0) 
lyp1      -0.192 (6.6)    -0.126 (7.5)  -0.194 (8.5)  -0.067 (4.7)   
liy1      -0.008 (0.7)            0.052 (4.4)   0.065 (7.3)  0.054 (5.8) 
lmy1      -0.024 (2.4)            0.010 (1.1)  -0.000 (0.0)  0.012 (1.9) 
trend       0.004 (5.3)    0.004 (7.3)   0.007 (8.9)  0.002 (5.0) 
Constant    -6.955 (4.8)   -7.510 (6.9)   -11.196 (8.5)  -3.440 (4.8) 
 
N      315    478    435    539 
Rsq within    0.256    0.231    0.375    0.234 
Rsq between    0.100    0.044    0.048    0.329 
Notes: absolute t ratios in parentheses. Income groupings based on World Bank list of economies (Jan 
2011). High income group included both OECD and non OECD. 
 
 
One possible reason for this is the degree of conflict, particularly civil conflict that poor 
countries have had. This is particularly the case for the Sub Saharan African region, 
where a high proportion of countries have experienced major conflict. Using the Smaldone 
(2003) categorisation of countries that have experienced major conflicts gave the results in 
Table 3. The results show a significant short run negative effect for military burden, but no 
significant long run effect. Breaking down this group into countries that have not 
experienced major conflict and those which have, left 8 countries in the latter group. The no 
conflict group had a significant negative coefficient estimate for the change in log military 
burden, but not for the lagged log level, and the conflict group had neither terms significant.    
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Table 3. Regression Results for Fixed Effects Model: SSA 
 
Variable    Total    No Conflict   Conflict       
       n=35    n=27     n=8       
 
∆liy      0.032 (2.6)   0.039 (2.9)   -0.018 (0.6)      
∆lmy      -0.022 (2.5)  -0.021 (2.2)  0.001 (0.0)     
lngd      -0.062 (4.1)  -0.050 (1.6)  -0.082 (4.4)     
lyp1      -0.121(5.8)  -0.108 (4.6)  -0.246 (5.3)     
liy1        0.012(1.4)   0.001 (0.1)   0.044 (2.0)      
lmy1      -0.009 (1.3)  -0.002 (0.3)  -0.002 (0.2)     
trend       0.002 (2.9)   0.001 (1.0)   0.006 (4.9) 
Constant     -2.392 (2.4)   -0.539 (0.5)   -10.868 (4.5) 
 
N      468    351     117       
Rsq within    0.126    0.115     0.376       
Rsq between    0.031    0.198     0.182       
 
Notes: absolute t ratios in parentheses 
Long run coefficient: 
 
These results are surprising as the no conflict group shows marked differences, has only 
one levels variable significant, lyp1, while for the group of countries in conflict it is the 
difference variables that are insignificant. This does seem to suggest that there is only a 
short run adjustment process for the no conflict group and only a long run relationship for 
the conflict one. This is an intriguing result. While the size of the conflict group means 
care must be taken in drawing any strong conclusions, it does suggest that considering the 





Military spending is an expenditure by governments that has influence beyond the 
resources it takes up, especially when it leads to or facilitates conflict.  Its economic 
impact is therefore of considerable concern. This paper has provided an analysis of 
military spending and economic growth for a large group of countries for the period 1988 to 
2006 and is one of the few that deal with the post Cold War period. It has also used the 
modelling framework suggested in Dunne et al (2006) which overcomes some of the 
shortcomings of earlier empirical analysis. Using a dynamic first order model and fixed 
effects panel data estimation method, gave very interesting results. Firstly, for all countries 
there was evidence of short run negative effects of military spending, but not long run. 
When the countries were broken down into 4 income groups there were clear differences, 
with the log military burden difference term significant and negative for all except the 
upper middle group and the lagged level significant and negative only for the low income 
group. Military spending would appear to have been more damaging to the poorer 
countries over this period.   10
 
 Focussing on Sub-Saharan Africa, gave the opportunity to consider the possible effect of 
conflict. The SSA results suggested a significant short run effect of military spending on 
growth for countries, but this is not evident in the long run. Estimates for SSA countries that 
had been involved in conflict showed no effect of military spending on growth. This is an 
interesting finding, but further investigation is required to confirm it, given the relatively 
small number of countries in the conflict group.  
 
Overall, he results here do imply that there is little or no evidence for a positive effect on 
economic growth and that it is more likely to have a negative effect, or at best no significant 




The data set contains data for 170 countries for period 1988 to 2006 
 
Region codes: Africa (North Africa = 11; Sub-Saharan =  12); America (Caribbean = 21; Central America 
= 22; North America = 23; South America = 24); Asia and Oceania (Central Asia = 31; East Asia = 32; 
South Asia = 33; Oceania = 34); Europe = 4; Middle East = 5 
Developed Dummy; Dummy variable 0 if a country is a developed country,  1 otherwise. 
Milex constant; This variable is from SIPRI which is military expenditure by region and country, in 
constant (2005) US$ m., 1988-2006 
Milex of GDP; This variable is also from SIPRI which is military expenditure by region and country, as 
percentage of gross domestic product, 1988-2005. 
All the other variables in dataset are taken from World Bank: World Development Indicators April (2008). 
Population; Total population of the country 
GDP; Data are in constant 2000 U.S. dollars 
Investment; Gross fixed capital formation constant 2000 US dollars (formerly gross domestic fixed 
investment).  
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